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LIES, DAMN LIES, AND WHITE INK: THE 
CONVENIENT FICTION OF ADJUDICATION 
ON THE MERITS IN MURDOCH V. CASTRO 
Abstract: On June 21, 2010, in Murdoch v. Castro, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that under the habeas reform provisions 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state 
court decisions presumptively adjudicate federal claims on the merits 
even where no state court has made any mention of the federal claim 
raised in the habeas petition. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit gives federal 
courts license to overlook errors, ignore contradictory state law and dis-
miss compelling constitutional claims raised by state prisoners. This 
Comment argues that following the approach advocated by Chief Judge 
Kozinski in dissent would better allow federal courts to keep faith with the 
goals of comity and federalism that motivated AEPDA. 
Introduction 
 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), state court adjudications of federal claims are entitled to a 
heightened level of deference whenever state court petitioners file ha-
beas corpus petitions in federal court.1 This Comment examines 
whether AEDPA deference is appropriate when the last state court 
opinion “clearly overlooked” the federal claim.2 Congress intended 
AEDPA to end the flood of habeas petitions filed in federal court by 
decreasing the incentive for state prisoners to file federally.3 Treating 
state court decisions with more deference would also enhance “comity, 
finality, and federalism” by allowing state criminal convictions to be-
come final more quickly.4 In the nearly fifteen years since its passage, 
AEDPA has been harshly criticized by scholars for being poorly drafted 
                                                                                                                      
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006); Robert D. Sloane, AEDPA’s “Adjudication on the Merits” 
Requirement: Collateral Review, Federalism, and Comity, 78 St. John’s L. Rev. 616–17 (2004); 
Margery I. Miller, Note, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting “Adjudicated on the Merits” 
when Habeas Corpus Is Understood as an Appellate Function of Federal Courts, 72 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2593, 2595 (2004). 
2 See infra notes 16–96 and accompanying text. 
3 Sloane, supra note 1, at 616–17. 
4 Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 
444–45 (2007). 
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and has also proven difficult for federal courts to apply uniformly.5 The 
federal circuits are particularly divided on how to approach state court 
decisions that do not address properly raised federal claims.6 
 In 2010, in Murdoch v. Castro, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit demonstrated how a federal court reviewing a habeas 
corpus petition can cheapen both respect for state law and prisoners’ 
federal rights by holding that a state court adjudicated a claim on the 
merits when that claim was clearly overlooked.7 Like most federal cir-
cuits, the Ninth Circuit generally assumes that all issues properly before 
a state appellate court have been adjudicated on the merits wherever 
there is a final disposition on non-procedural grounds.8 In Murdoch, 
however, a properly raised federal claim, supported by binding state 
and federal Supreme Court precedent, went completely unmentioned 
by the state appellate court opinion.9 As Chief Judge Kozinski persua-
sively argued in dissent, it disdains state law to find that a claim that was 
never mentioned was in fact adjudicated on the merits because 
“[c]ourts just don’t do that kind of work in white ink.”10 This Comment 
sides with Chief Judge Kozinski and concludes that federal courts ap-
plying AEDPA must review the state court record diligently to deter-
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. at 493–96 (describing circuit splits regarding the interpretation of § 2254(d)); 
Sloane, supra note 1, at 619–20 (same); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and 
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act, 47 Duke L.J. 1, 41–44 (1997) (proposing an alternative interpretation of 
§ 2254(d)). See generally 28 U.S.C § 2254(d) (passed in 1996). 
6 See Brittany Glidden, Note, When the State Is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA’s Adjudication 
Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 177, 184 n.37 (2002); Ezra Spilke, Com-
ment, Adjudicated on the Merits?: Why the AEDPA Requires State Courts to Exhibit Their Reason-
ing, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 995, 997, 1008–10 (2006); Claudia Wilner, Note, “We Would Not 
Defer to That Which Did Not Exist”: AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1442, 1443 (2002). 
7 See 609 F.3d 983, 989, 990 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010). 
8 See id. This approach to adjudication on the merits is firmly established in the Ninth 
Circuit. See Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]his court must 
assume that the state court has decided all the issues.”); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 
742 (9th Cir. 2005); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). The “any non-
procedural disposition” approach is also established in other federal circuits. See, e.g., Neal 
v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 
(2d Cir. 2001); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158–59 (4th Cir. 2000); Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 
1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). But see Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Gruning v. Dipaolo, 311 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2002). 
9 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 1000 (Kozinksi, C.J., dissenting). 
10 See id. at 1001. 
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mine if the federal claim has actually been adjudicated on the merits 
and not overlooked in error.11 
 Part I provides background on AEDPA and the circuit split over 
how it requires federal courts to treat state court opinions silent on 
federal claims.12 Part II examines the Ninth Circuit’s decision to deny 
habeas relief in Murdoch and explains how this decision exemplifies the 
major issues of AEDPA jurisprudence.13 Part III studies Chief Judge 
Kozinski’s dissent in Murdoch and shows that it presents a novel ap-
proach to determining whether federal claims have been overlooked by 
state courts.14 Finally, Part IV concludes that Chief Judge Kozinski’s ap-
proach is the best way to respect both prisoners’ rights and state law.15 
I. The Controversy Over AEDPA Review and Silent State Court 
Opinions 
A. AEDPA’s Application and Silent State Court Opinions 
 AEDPA, passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, 
was designed to create new tools to apprehend and prosecute terrorists 
by making all criminal convictions final more quickly.16 Congress en-
acted § 2254(d) to “streamline Federal appeals for convicted criminals 
sentenced to the death penalty.” 17 Beyond this goal of reducing delays 
in achieving final decisions in criminal cases, the AEDPA’s legislative 
history provides very little insight into the way Congress intended the 
provision to function in practice.18 Section 2254(d) reads: 
                                                                                                                      
11 See id. (“When a state court doesn’t decide a federal claim but we defer nevertheless, 
a petitioner is stripped of his right to have some court, any court, determine whether he’s 
‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”). 
12 See infra notes 16–45 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 46–65 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 66–74 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 75–96 and accompanying text. 
16 Miller, supra note 1, at 2610. Although AEDPA’s title suggests it might only apply in 
cases involving terrorism or the death penalty, § 2254 reformed habeas for any petition 
filed in federal court; thus, anyone incarcerated by the state—whether awaiting execution 
or serving a term of years—is subject to AEDPA. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C § 2254(d) (2006). 
17 Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 630, 631 (Apr. 24, 1997). 
18 See Carrie M. Bowden, The Need for Comity: A Proposal for Federal Court Review of Sup-
pression Issues in the Dual Sovereignty Context After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 223–28 (2003). Bowden explains that the word 
deference was removed from the legislation after compromises aimed to limit the original 
drafters’ intent to eliminate virtually all federal review of habeas petitions filed in state 
court. Id. at 224–25. 
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(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudi-
cated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the ad-
judication of the claim— 
 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreason-
able determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
sented in the state court proceeding.19 
 According to the plain meaning of § 2254(d), AEDPA’s deferential 
standard of review only applies when the petitioner’s claim was adjudi-
cated on the merits in state court.20 Only after a federal court deter-
mines that this threshold inquiry is satisfied can that court apply the 
substance of the act to determine if the state court adjudication of the 
claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”21 If the state 
court adjudication was not on the merits, the substance of AEDPA is 
not triggered and the federal court reviews the claim de novo.22 When 
evaluating state court opinions that are silent with respect to federal 
claims, the federal circuits are split both with regard to how to address 
the threshold question of adjudication and with regard to the correct 
way to interpret the substance of AEDPA’s deference provision.23 
 When a petitioner properly raises a federal claim and the state 
court does not address that claim in the text of its decision, the result is 
a “silent state court opinion” —a decision that provides no hint of why 
the particular federal claim was rejected.24 There are two common ways 
state courts remain silent on properly raised federal claims:25 first, a 
state court issues a summary disposition;26 second, a state court issues a 
full opinion addressing other claims but not the specific federal claim 
                                                                                                                      
19 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
20 See id.; Sloane, supra note 1, at 616. 
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Spilke, supra note 6, at 1004. 
22 See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 990 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010). 
23 See Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 493–97. 
24 See Wilner, supra note 6, at 1455–56. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
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subsequently raised in the federal habeas petition.27 Murdoch falls into 
the second category.28 
                                                                                                                     
 Frequently, the fate of a habeas petition depends on whether a 
state’s silent denial of a federal claim constitutes an adjudication on the 
merits.29 If a decision is not on the merits, AEDPA does not apply and a 
federal court may review the claim afresh and apply both circuit and 
Supreme Court precedent.30 If, however, a silent denial is found to be 
an adjudication on the merits, AEDPA only allows a federal court to 
decide whether the decision was objectively unreasonable according to 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent.31 To make this determi-
nation, a federal court must evaluate whether the state court opinion, 
which makes no reference to a federal claim, is contrary to or involves 
an unreasonable application of federal law.32 The curious result of this 
analysis is that a reviewing court may uphold state court decisions that 
make invisible, but “objectively reasonable,” constitutional errors.33 The 
“difficult and artificial” nature of this sort of review reveals a problem 
that permeates AEDPA analysis of state court opinions that are silent on 
a contested federal claim: how, if at all, can a habeas court defer to rea-
soning which is “not merely undiscoverable but nonexistent?”34 
B. Circuit Splits on “Adjudication on the Merits” 
 Consensus among the circuits regarding how to treat silent state 
court opinions eludes the federal courts.35 Initially, a slim majority of 
the federal circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, held “adjudication on 
the merits” to be “a term of art that refers to whether a court’s disposi-
 
27 See id. 
28 See 609 F.3d at 989. The Supreme Court addressed the first situation in January and 
determined summary dispositions can be adjudications on the merits when there are no 
state law procedural principles that indicate otherwise. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 
770, 784–85 (2011). The method for determining when an opinion provides such an indi-
cation was beyond the scope of the decision. See id. 
29 See Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 493. 
30 See e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
520–21 (2003). 
31 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–
06, 409 (2000). 
32 See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71; Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. 
33 See e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
520–21 (2003). 
34 See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1992) (describing the difficulty of deter-
mining the effect of a summary disposition issued by the California Supreme Court). 
35 See Wilner, supra note 6, at 1456. 
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tion of the case was substantive as opposed to procedural.”36 Circuits 
that apply AEDPA to silent state court opinions are hopelessly frac-
tured, however, on how to analyze when silent opinions apply federal 
law unreasonably.37 
 A growing minority of circuits, including the First and Sixth Cir-
cuits, hold that to be adjudicated on the merits a federal claim must 
have at least been mentioned by the state court.38 Under this approach, 
both types of silent state court opinions—summary dispositions and 
otherwise reasoned decisions that fail to address the federal claim at 
issue—fail to pass the threshold inquiry of AEDPA; thus, the federal 
court may review the claim de novo.39 Because these circuits never ap-
ply the substance of AEDPA to silent state court opinions, they avoid 
the difficulty of trying to determine whether an opinion which never 
addressed a federal claim involved an unreasonable application of fed-
eral law.40 
 In the Ninth Circuit, however, a decision that a silent state court 
opinion has in fact been adjudicated on the merits results from a 
somewhat convoluted review of whether the state court arrived at its 
decision through an “objectively unreasonable” application of federal 
law.41 This inquiry requires a reviewing court to analyze whether a re-
                                                                                                                      
36 See, e.g., Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001); Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 
F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158, 159 (4th Cir. 2000); Aycox v. 
Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). But see Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th 
Cir. 2006); Gruning v. Dipaolo, 311 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2002); Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 
1044, 1051, 1053 (10th Cir. 2001). 
37 See Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 496–98. This Comment does not discuss the split over 
how to apply the substance of AEDPA to silent state court opinions; for a discussion of that 
issue, see id. at 496–502 (discussing whether courts should focus on the result or the rea-
soning of state court opinions when determining if a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief 
under AEDPA). 
38 See, e.g., Lyell, 470 F.3d at 1182 (holding a federal claim was not adjudicated on the 
merits when state opinion only discussed it in state law terms); Gruning, 311 F.3d at 71 
(“[W]e can hardly defer to the state court on an issue that the state court did not address.” 
(quoting Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001))); Neill, 278 F.3d at 1051, 1058 
(reviewing ineffective assistance claim de novo because the state appellate court did not 
reach the merits of the claim). 
39 See Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 493–96. At least as applied to summary dispositions, 
this approach is wrong after the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Harrington v. Richter. See 
131 S. Ct. at 783–84. The courts currently applying the minority approach, however, have 
done so with respect to fully written opinions and not summary dispositions. See supra note 
38 and accompanying text. 
40 See id. 
41 See Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Pham v. Terhune, 400 
F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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sult is unreasonable without evidence of a state court’s reasoning.42 Fur-
ther, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state courts need not cite or 
even be aware of federal case law to adjudicate a claim reasonably.43 
Although this makes sense because a court need not cite a case to de-
termine and apply the correct legal principle, it is unclear whether a 
decision should be entitled to deference if a court has applied no prin-
ciple at all in reaching its conclusion or has erroneously overlooked a 
claim.44 This was the situation in Murdoch.45 
II. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach to Adjudicated  
on the Merits 
 More than a decade after a 1983 robbery at the Horseshoe Bar in 
Long Beach, California, police arrested Dino Dinardo after improve-
ments in fingerprint technology uncovered his prints on the cash regis-
ter.46 Following his arrest, Dinardo identified Murdoch as his accom-
plice.47 Dinardo was charged with and convicted of a murder that 
happened during the robbery.48 After assurances from the trial judge 
that his life sentence would be reduced if he testified against Murdoch, 
Dinardo became the state’s key witness at Murdoch’s murder trial.49 
Before his trial ended, however, Dinardo wrote a letter to his attorney 
claiming he was coerced by the police into implicating Murdoch in the 
crime.50 When Murdoch’s counsel sought to use the letter to impeach 
Dinardo in cross-examination, the trial court held attorney-client privi-
lege barred the introduction of the letter.51 Murdoch was convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole.52 
 On appeal, Murdoch argued that he was unable to cross-examine 
Dinardo effectively, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to con-
front his accuser.53 Without reference to the Confrontation Clause, the 
California Court of Appeals affirmed Murdoch’s conviction and denied 
                                                                                                                      
42 See, e.g., Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 989; Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109. 
43 Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 
44 See Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 493–96. 
45 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 990 n.6. 
46 Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 2010). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 985, 986. 
49 Id. at 986. 
50 Id. at 987. 
51 Id. 
52 Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 987. 
53 Id. at 987–88. 
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his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.54 Murdoch then filed a petition 
for the writ in federal court, which ultimately led to the Ninth Circuit’s 
en banc opinion denying habeas relief under AEDPA.55 
 Murdoch presents an extreme example of the silent state court 
opinion problem.56 Not only did the California Court of Appeals fail to 
mention the Confrontation Clause or cite any relevant state or federal 
precedent, it also neglected to include the perfunctory language “de-
fendants remaining contentions do not merit discussion.”57 As a result, 
under California law, Murdoch’s federal claim was arguably not adjudi-
cated on the merits.58 Moreover, because Murdoch’s brief cited two Cal-
ifornia cases dealing with attorney-client privilege and the Confronta-
tion Clause—including one decided by California’s Supreme Court— it 
appears the appeals court overlooked Murdoch’s Sixth Amendment 
argument.59 
 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals had adjudicated Murdoch’s Confrontation 
Clause claim on the merits.60 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed the issue only summarily, citing to a handful of cases that 
apparently required the Ninth Circuit to assume all issues properly be-
fore the state court were decided on the merits.61 None of the cited de-
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. 
55 See id. The procedural history of the case is more complicated than this text indi-
cates; it has been abridged for the sake of clarity. See id. (detailing the history of Murdoch’s 
journey through the Ninth Circuit). 
56 See id. at 990 n.6. 
57 See id. at 1000 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). The majority, however, concluded that the 
California court did address Murdoch’s Confrontation Clause argument because, while 
discussing another argument of Murdoch’s, the court quoted People v. Godlewski, a case that 
discussed attorney-client privilege and the Confrontation Clause. See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 
990 n.6 (majority opinion); People v. Godlewski, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 1993). 
58 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 1000 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lewis v. Superior 
Court, 970 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1999); People v. Rojas, 173 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1981)). In People 
v. Rojas, the California Court of Appeals held that California courts must show that they 
“necessarily and carefully analyzed the contentions” and that failure to do so may lead to 
reversal. 173 Cal. Rptr. at 64. This holding seemingly requires at least a statement that any 
unaddressed issues lack merit. See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 1000 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
59 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 1001 (discussing People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 440–41 
(Cal. 1992) (holding that the right to cross-examine a cooperating witness for bias trumps 
the attorney-client privilege); Vela v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 141, 150 (Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that defendant’s right to cross examine police officers testifying against 
him trumps officers’ claims of attorney-client privilege)). 
60 See id. at 995–96 (majority opinion). 
61 See id. at 986–90 (citing Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2002); Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 
346–48 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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cisions, however, stated that all state court decisions not clearly based on 
procedural grounds adjudicate federal claims on the merits for pur-
poses of AEDPA.62 In fact, the only case that addressed, in any depth, 
how to treat unreasoned opinions was a pre-AEDPA decision involving 
whether summary dispositions can be treated as resting on adequate 
and independent state law grounds.63 The majority in Murdoch, follow-
ing in the footsteps of earlier Ninth Circuit decisions, failed to consider 
whether adjudicated on merits has special meaning in the context of 
AEDPA.64 After applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the 
majority simply held that Murdoch’s imprisonment was not contrary to 
clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.65 
III. Chief Judge Kozinski’s Approach to Adjudication  
on the Merits 
 Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Murdoch presents an interesting 
approach to evaluating silent state court opinions that aims to uncover 
how state courts have resolved the question of adjudication on the mer-
its when faced with similar situations.66 He suggests that comity and 
federalism—the statutory purposes often cited to support deference to 
state court decisions—require more in-depth analysis of what the state 
court actually decided.67 Particularly, when considering “white ink” and 
“the sounds of silence,” federal courts should not show contrived def-
erence by assuming that state courts have decided issues that they clear-
ly have not.68 
 To follow Chief Judge Kozinski’s approach, courts should perform 
a two-tiered inquiry: first, examine the state court record to determine 
if compelling arguments, whether based on federal or state precedent, 
were raised in the briefs but subsequently ignored in the decision; and 
second, examine state law on the meaning of adjudication of the mer-
its.69 In evaluating Murdoch’s claim, Chief Judge Kozinski reviewed 
                                                                                                                      
62 See Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109 (stating that when it is clear that the state court has not 
decided an issue, courts review that question de novo); Lambert, 393 F.3d at 969. 
63 See Hunter, 982 F.2d at 346. 
64 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 986–90 (citing Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109; Lambert, 393 F.3d 
at 969; Hunter, 982 F.2d at 346–48). 
65 See id. at 995–96. 
66 See 609 F.3d 983, 998–1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 998. 
68 See id. at 1001. 
69 See id. at 998–1001. 
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three major sources: the text of the California appellate court’s deci-
sion, the text of Murdoch’s briefs and any state and federal precedent 
cited therein, and California’s appellate rules and case law on the 
meaning of adjudication on the merits.70 
 Thus, rather than blindly assuming that all issues before the state 
court were decided, Chief Judge Kozinski suggests that courts must re-
view the lower court record to determine if the federal claim was over-
looked or adjudicated on the merits.71 When petitioners raise a federal 
claim supported by precedent binding on the state court, and the state 
court issues a decision contrary to that precedent without attempting to 
distinguish it, federal courts should be willing to find that the state 
court did not decide the issue.72 Federal court review of the state court 
record would serve the interest of comity by ensuring that controlling 
state precedent was not ignored.73 Because Chief Judge Kozinski’s ap-
proach to AEDPA review acknowledges that there is some work courts 
do not do in “white ink,” his approach would prevent federal courts 
from deferring to fictional adjudications on the merits that arrive at 
results contrary to state law.74 
IV. Why Chief Judge Kozinski’s Approach Furthers Comity, 
Finality, and Federalism 
 Applying Chief Judge Kozinski’s approach to adjudication on the 
merits would clarify AEDPA’s threshold inquiry when state courts are 
silent on federal claims, and would limit any artificial application of 
AEDPA’s substance to silent state court opinions.75 This middle-of-the-
road approach still allows for AEDPA review to silent state court opin-
ions when the state record, in its totality, suggests the claim was consid-
ered rather than overlooked.76 This approach would allow silent state 
court opinions to be reviewed consistently with the Supreme Court’s 
2011 decision in Harrington v. Richter, which held that summary disposi-
tions can be presumed to be adjudications on the merits.77 
                                                                                                                      
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 998–1000. 
72 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 998–1001 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
73 See id. at 998, 1009. 
74 See id. at 1001. 
75 See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 998–1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dis-
senting). 
76 See id. at 998, 1009. 
77 See 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011) (“When a federal claim has been presented to a 
state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court 
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 The First Circuit’s approach—not applying AEDPA to any silent 
state court opinion—permits too much de novo review.78 AEDPA 
aimed to increase judicial efficiency by decreasing the relitigation of 
claims that had already been heard in state court.79 Problematically, as 
the Supreme Court acknowledged in Harrington, an approach that 
treats all silent state court opinions the same would allow federal court 
review even when state courts summarily dismiss claims without expla-
nation because the claims are completely lacking in merit.80 This is un-
doubtedly part of what AEDPA sought to avoid.81 In fact, more than 
half of the states disagree with this approach because of how frequently 
their courts rely on summary dispositions to resolve habeas petitions.82 
                                                                                                                     
 In contrast, the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Murdoch 
reaches illogical results when applied to written opinions that overlook 
properly raised federal claims.83 Under this approach, constitutional 
errors justified only in “white ink” can be allowed to stand so long as 
they are reasonable, even if compelling federal precedent and binding 
state precedent dictate the result is incorrect.84 The result is not defer-
ence to state law; it is indifference towards it.85 Furthering the interest 
of comity undoubtedly requires federal courts to at least examine state 
law before determining whether a claim has been adjudicated on the 
merits.86 Comity should also encourage an evaluation of the record as a 
whole to ensure that the state court actually decided a claim before a 
federal court deems it adjudicated on the merits.87 When a court takes 
the time to give reasons for its decision and then fails to reach or ad-
dress a crucial part of a petitioner’s claim, there is little reason to be-
 
adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law proce-
dural principles to the contrary.”). 
78 See Gruning v. Dipaolo 311 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Lyell v. Renico 470 
F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (6th Cir. 2006). 
79 See Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 455–57. 
80 See generally Brief of Texas et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–7, Har-
rington v. Richter, No. 09–587, 2010 WL 2005329 (2010) (thirty-three states arguing it would 
be overly burdensome to require a written opinion for an adjudication on the merits). 
81 See Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 Am. 
J. Crim. L. 223, 242 (2002) (arguing that AEDPA “requires federal court deference to a 
state-court decision which is clearly on the merits of a federal question, even if unaccom-
panied by an articulated rationale”). 
82 See generally Brief of Texas et al., supra note 80. 
83 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 998, 1009 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801–03 (1992). 
87 See Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 998, 1009 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
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lieve the issue was adjudicated on the merits.88 Indeed, in this situation, 
the text of the decision suggests it was not.89 
 Moreover, if a relatively controversial issue is clearly overlooked or 
ignored at the state court level, the federal court should review the issue 
de novo to encourage state courts to explain their opinions on contro-
versial issues and contribute to the constitutional dialogue.90 Federal 
courts should not reward state courts by deferring to their opinions 
when they deliberately or carelessly fail to reach or discuss controversial 
issues because deferring too often to unreasoned opinions will have a 
negative impact on the development of constitutional law.91 Ignoring 
legitimate prisoner claims, which have not been addressed by any court, 
will stifle the development of constitutional criminal procedure by de-
creasing the number of opinions that completely reason through diffi-
cult constitutional issues.92 AEDPA already limits how many courts can 
evaluate the federal constitutional issues.93 Correspondingly, the num-
ber of state habeas cases heard by the Supreme Court has declined in 
recent years.94 It is undesirable to impose further limitations at the risk 
of making federal law more unclear.95 Both state and federal courts, 
however, have an obligation to contribute to the federal constitutional 
dialogue by addressing legitimate constitutional claims.96 
Conclusion 
 Murdoch exemplifies the struggle federal courts continue to face 
when applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review to silent state 
court opinions. Because genuine habeas review is vital to vindicating 
                                                                                                                      
88 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (reviewing de novo the second prong 
of a federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the state opinion stated it only 
reached the first prong). 
89 See id.; Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 998, 1009. 
90 See Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The 
Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 211, 215, 227 (2008). 
91 See id. at 227. 
92 See id. at 222–27 (stating that AEDPA has effectively ended the conversation because 
under AEDPA federal courts lack the power to resolve emerging constitutional issues in 
the context of state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions). 
93 See id. at 227. 
94 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing 
Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1357 (2010) (stating that the reduc-
tion in the Supreme Court’s criminal docket occurred entirely in state criminal cases and 
habeas cases). 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
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federal constitutional rights, the federal circuits must retain their power 
to say what the law is by reviewing valid federal claims that no court has 
reasoned through. Principles of federalism and comity do not bar fed-
eral courts from examining state law and the state appellate record; in 
fact, these principles ought to encourage it. When state courts ignore 
controversial issues or overlook contested claims by issuing decisions 
supported by reasoning performed in “white ink,” they disregard their 
obligation to defend or interpret the federal Constitution, and any fed-
eral court that blindly defers to such a decision is complicit in trans-
forming habeas corpus from the Great Writ to a convenient fiction. 
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